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Loss & Damage: a Critical Discourse Analysis of Parties’ Positions in 
Climate Change Negotiations 
The years-long negotiations on loss and damage (L&D) associated with climate 
change impacts reached a milestone with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
sanctioning the permanence of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) 
created in 2013. The WIM aims at advancing knowledge gathering, coordination 
and support to address L&D associated with extreme and slow onset events in 
vulnerable developing countries (Decision 2/CP.19). Despite being among the 
most controversial issues to be recently treated in climate change negotiation, L&D 
has attracted little attention in the field of international relations. This paper aims 
at addressing this gap by reconstructing the emergence and evolution of the 
negotiating positions on L&D of developing and developed countries. It employs 
a critical discourse analytical approach and builds on Fairclough’s three-
dimensional framework for critical discourse analysis, taking decision 2/CP.19 as 
the core communicative event. Consistently, the decision is analysed at three 
different levels: as a text (micro scale); as a discursive practice (meso scale); and 
as a social practice (macro scale). The analysis makes use of a wide range of 
materials including previous decisions, High Level Segment statements and Parties 
submissions. It reconstructs Parties’ conflicting views on the positioning of L&D 
vis-à-vis the adaptation space (L&D as a part of, or as beyond adaptation) and the 
scientific, ethical and legal arguments employed to support these standpoints. It 
highlights, in particular, the strategic importance which the ‘compensation 
argument’ had in determining developing countries’ capacity to influence the 
UNFCCC process up to the inclusion of a specific article on L&D in the Paris 
Agreement. While calls for compensation might have lost momentum as a result 
of the Warsaw and Paris talks, the paper argues that their potential is far from 
exhausted. They in fact imply a more general request for climate justice which the 
UNFCCC has not yet addressed.  
Keywords: Loss and Damage; climate change negotiations; critical discourse 
analysis; compensation; climate justice 
  
Introduction 
The years-long negotiations on loss and damage (L&D) associated with climate 
change impacts reached a milestone during the twenty-first session of the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (COP 21) with the inclusion of a dedicated article in the Paris 
Agreement. Article 8 recognizes the importance of ‘averting, minimizing and addressing’ 
L&D, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the associated risk. It sanctions 
the permanence of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), created in 2013 to 
advance knowledge gathering, coordination and support to address L&D associated with 
the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme and slow onset events, in 
particularly vulnerable developing countries (UNFCCC 2014b). At the same time, it 
leaves the door open for the WIM to be ‘enhanced and strengthened’ through future COP 
decisions. The article calls on Parties to work ‘on a cooperative and facilitative basis’ to 
‘enhance understanding, action and support’ in areas including early warning systems, 
comprehensive risk assessment and management, risk insurance facilities, climate risk 
pooling, and non-economic losses. 
 Discussion on L&D, formally initiated with the 2007 Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 
2008) and later embedded in the Cancun Adaptation Framework (UNFCCC 2011c), has 
been campaigned by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) since the early 1990s. 
AOSIS’ claims have mainly focused on the establishment of a compensation mechanism, 
able to indemnify the developing countries for those unavoidable impacts that materialize 
when both mitigation and adaptation actions have been undertaken. However, the WIM 
does not consider the most advanced economies accountable for past and ongoing human-
induced climate change, nor does it make any tangible commitment for helping low-
income and small developing island states to cope with L&D.  
The WIM’s focus on knowledge and expertise sharing activities reflects the 
ongoing disagreement on the exact boundaries of the L&D concept. The developing 
countries consider L&D to be something beyond adaptation, referring to those impacts 
that can no longer be addressed by mitigating emissions or helping countries to adapt. On 
the other hand, developed countries refuse the idea that L&D is something qualitatively 
different from adaptation, and contain the concept within its scope. This dispute seems 
far from settled. At the UNFCCC level no formal discussion has yet been undertaken on 
what L&D could signify. A mere working definition has been adopted, vaguely 
describing L&D as ‘the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated with 
climate change in developing countries that negatively affect human and natural systems’ 
(UNFCCC 2012d). The definition distinguishes losses from damages on the basis of the 
‘irreversibility’ of the negative impacts, where the former are those for which restoration 
is impossible and the latter those that can instead be repaired. Emphasis is also placed on 
the difficulties in evaluating L&D from an economic point of view, given the challenges 
in attaching monetary values to important factors such as life, culture, livelihood, territory 
and statehood, among others.  
The issue of L&D has attracted increasing attention among the climate change 
academic community, although being almost disregarded in the field of international 
relations. Efforts have been made to provide historical overviews on the emergence of 
L&D in international talks, to analyse the role of the UNFCCC in addressing it, and to 
discuss the possible implications of the WIM (McNamara 2014; Huq, Roberts, and 
Fenton 2013; Roberts and Huq 2015; Stabinsky and Hoffmaister 2015; Mathew and Akter 
2015); to frame it through a disaster risk management and reduction perspective (Fekete 
and Sakdapolrak 2014; Birkmann and Welle 2015; Mechler et al. 2014); to outline the 
main contributions attribution studies could offer to the assessment of L&D (James et al. 
2014; Huggel et al. 2013); to show its connection with the concept of state responsibility 
(Verheyen 2015; Tol and Verheyen 2004; Verheyen 2012; Mayer 2014). Some authors 
(Warner & van der Geest, 2013, 2015) have taken a promising look at the connection 
between L&D and the constraints and limits to adaptation literature (Dow et al. 2013; 
IPCC 2014; Adger et al. 2009), breaking as yet unexplored ground for future research.  
Despite this growing academic interest, the main conceptual and operational 
issues around L&D remain widely debated (Wrathall et al., 2015). Important questions 
include the qualification of  L&D as a different category within climate change impacts 
and the consequent need for it to be addressed with an ad hoc instrument. Arguably, the 
sole circumstance of its materialising in particularly vulnerable developing countries, as 
mentioned in the working definition as well as in the Warsaw Decision, seems a necessary 
but not sufficient condition. Framing L&D as the actual or expected climate change 
impacts which exceed the scope of adaptation might provide a better ground for 
qualifying them. Yet, positioning L&D vis-a-vis the adaptation space is indeed 
problematic. Should only the social, technical and physically hard limits to adaptation be 
considered in defining L&D? Or should the financial, institutional, cultural, behavioural 
constraints that could in principle be overcome but that in fact prevent effective 
adaptation actions to take place also be considered? Should the latter hold true, 
distinguishing action on L&D from other adaptation -but also development and disaster 
risk reduction- strategies would become ultimately difficult. While it might exceed the 
scope of this paper to examine these definitional issues, it interestingly explore how the 
related conceptual uncertainties and ambiguities have translated at the negotiations level. 
In particular, this paper aims at reconstructing the emergence and interaction of different 
discourses, i.e. forms of understanding and representing L&D, under the UNFCCC and 
the way they eventually shaped both the structure and the content of the WIM. To do so, 
it employs a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a strategy not only for interpreting but 
also for explaining discourse structures (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). The choice of 
CDA is also instrumental for gaining insights into the unfolding of power relations among 
Parties on L&D, given the interest of critical studies on the relationship between power 
and language. In particular, CDA particularly focuses on the ways discourse structures 
enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in 
society (van Dijk 2001).  
Hence, the paper contributes to the existing literature on L&D in three ways: (1) 
by providing a systematic analysis of how discourses on L&D have emerged and evolved 
within climate negotiations; (2) by highlighting the main elements impeding a common 
framing of (and thus action on) the issue; (3) by offering insights into the negotiating 
strategy on L&D of the developing countries’ and their capacity to influence the 
UNFCCC process. It is organised as follows. The first section provides an overview of 
the theory and method of discourse analysis: particular attention in given to the CDA 
approach and its theorization by Norman Fairclough. The subsequent analysis applies 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for CDA to Decision 2/CP.19 establishing the 
WIM. The latter was chosen as the core communicative event, for it represents a 
fundamental milestone in the L&D discussion under the UNFCCC. The Decision is 
analysed in connection with other official UNFCCC documents, which include previous 
COP decisions (1/CP.16, 7/CP.17, 3/CP.18), High Level Segment statements made by 
Heads of States and Governments at COP 19/CMP 9, and Parties’ submissions to the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA), and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action (ADP). The findings are discussed in the light of the negotiation 
process leading to the inclusion of Article 8 on L&D in the Paris Agreement. The main 
sources of discord are identified in Parties’ positioning of L&D vis-à-vis the adaptation 
space (L&D as a part of or as beyond adaptation) and in the ethical (fairness concerns 
and non-economic L&D), scientific (issues of attribution) and legal (State Responsibility 
for wrongful acts) arguments employed to support these standpoints. Particular attention 
is placed on analysing the strategic importance the State Responsibility-compensation 
argument had in determining the capacity of the developing countries to influence the 
UNFCCC process. Although after Paris compensation may no longer be the elephant in 
the room, the discourse analysis suggests a potential for it to re-emerge. Disputes of this 
type are symptoms of a more general need for climate equity and justice that the 
UNFCCC has not yet addressed. 
 
Methods and materials 
Although there is no generally accepted definition of discourse in social science 
(Pedersen 2009), it might be generally interpreted as a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world, or one aspect of the world (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). 
Discourse analysis is a strategy for revealing how the understanding of the world is built 
through language and how, conversely, language contributes to changing social reality. It 
draws attention to the way discourse is produced, what it excludes, the way some kinds 
of knowledge become significant while other do not, and the way power relations are 
reflected in language (Friman 2013; Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011). 
Discourse Analysis is rooted in a social constructionist approach within social 
sciences and humanities (Pedersen 2009). Despite the common epistemological premises, 
a number of approaches can be found that differ inter alia with respect to the role of 
discourse in the construction of the world and the analytical focus (van Dijk 2001). 
Among them, CDA is primarily concerned with ‘the connections/relationships between 
language use, its producers and consumers, and the social and political contexts, 
structures, and practices in which it occurs’ (Waugh et al. 2015). In this sense, the notion 
of context is crucial for CDA (Meyer 2001), with discourses being understood as 
historically produced and interpreted, as well as structured by existing power relations 
and ideologies. Given the relevance of extralinguistic factors such as culture, society, and 
ideology (Meyer 2001), CDA calls for a wide range of analytical tools to be employed 
and a transdisciplinary approach to be followed (Fairclough 2003).   
In critical discourse studies particular relevance is given to the relation between 
language and power (Wodak 2001). Consistently, they focus on the ways discourse 
structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and 
dominance in society (van Dijk 2001). Attention is given to social problems and political 
issues, in an attempt not only to interpret but also to explain discourse structures 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997). Investigating power relations in society helps to reveal 
inequalities and thus to contribute to social change. In this sense the analysis is meant to 
be critical. As negotiations under the UNFCCC are characterized by marked power 
asymmetries, CDA turns out to be useful for detecting whether such asymmetries were 
reflected in L&D discussions. Although CDA theory and methodologies are commonly 
employed in IR research (Farrands, El-Anis, and Pettiford 2015), their application to the 
context of climate change negotiations is still at an early stage (see, for instance Friman, 
2007, on historical responsibility in climate talks). 
Among CDA approaches, the paper builds upon Norman Fairclough’s theoretical 
contribution to critical discourse studies for his emphasis on the empirical and systematic 
analysis of language use in social interactions. A central idea in his work is that discourse 
is not only constitutive, but also constituted (Fairclough 1992). Therefore, a two-way 
relation is established: discourse is a social practice that reproduces and changes 
knowledge but at the same time it is also shaped by social practices and structures. Thus, 
contrarily to other approaches to discourse analysis, his keeps a distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive practices. Discourses include texts, talks and other 
semiological systems, while there are other practices (economy, for instance) that follow 
different logics and need to be studied with different analytical tools. For the analysis of 
COP Decision 2/CP.19, the paper adopts his three-dimensional model for CDA 
(Fairclough 1992). The starting point is the consideration of two important elements of 
the discourse: (1) the communicative event (e.g., a text or a speech); (2) the order of 
discourse, i.e. the configuration of all discourse types used in a specific field. The 
communicative event has three dimensions, each of which is to be covered by a specific 
analysis: 
(1) it is a text, and should be subject to a linguistic analysis including vocabulary, 
grammar, syntax (micro scale analysis); 
(2) it is a discursive practice: attention should be given to how the text is produced 
and consumed, focusing on the way power relations are enacted. The underlying 
hegemonic processes, through which consensus around meanings emerges, 
should be explored (meso scale analysis); 
(3) it is a social practice, which implies consideration of how the discursive practices 
reproduce or restructure the existing order of discourse and how this translates 
into social change (macro scale analysis). 
The analysis of COP Decision 2/CP.19 (communicative event) in section 3 is carried 
out according to these three dimensions, although not in the order described above. This 
is because Fairclough’s model offers multiple entry points for analysis: the scale chosen 
for beginning with is not relevant as long as all the three scales are analysed and their 
mutual interconnection is shown (Janks 1997). Consistently, section 3 starts with the 
analysis of the discursive practice (meso scale) in order to provide the reader with an 
overview of the particular discourses employed by Parties up to the Warsaw Conference. 
The text of 2/CP.19 constitutes the core of the analysis and is examined in connection 
with other relevant documents, including previous COP decisions (1/CP 16, 7/CP 17, 
3/CP 18), High Level Segment statements made by Heads of States and Governments at 
COP 19/CMP 9 (n=133), Parties’ submissions to the SBI, SBSTA and ADP (n=33), press 
releases and other relevant documents available at the UNFCCC website. Table 1 
(Primary and secondary sources used for carrying out the CDA) shows the materials 
employed at the different scales of the analysis. The use of such a wide range of materials 
was functional to reconstructing in an organic way the different discourses adopted by 
Parties on L&D from the early 1990s onwards. 
 








Decision 2/ CP 19.Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change 
impacts (UNFCCC 2014b) 
Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts. Proposal 









Decision 1/CP 16. The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UNFCCC 2011c); 
Decision 7/CP 17. Work programme on loss and damage (UNFCCC 2012e); 
Decision 3/CP 18. Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in 
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance 
adaptive capacity(UNFCCC 2013c). 
 
High Level Segment statements 
by Heads of States and 
Governments 
High Level Segment statements by Heads of States and Governments at COP 19/CMP 9 (UNFCCC 
2013b) 
Number of individual 
submissions: 1131 
Submissions by parties and 
organizations to the SBI 
Views and information on elements to be included in the work programme on loss and damage. 
Submissions from Parties and relevant organizations.(UNFCCC 2011a) 
Number of individual 
submissions: 22 
Views and information on the thematic areas in the implementation of the work programme (UNFCCC 
2011b)  
Number of individual 
submissions: 7 
Views and information from Parties and relevant organizations on the possible elements to be included in 
the recommendations on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC 2012a)  
Number of individual 
submissions: 3 
Views and information from Parties and relevant organizations on the possible elements to be included in 
the recommendations on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/CP.16. Add.1(UNFCCC 2012b)  
Number of individual 
submissions: 13 
Views and information from Parties and relevant organizations on the possible elements to be included in 
the recommendations on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/CP.16. Add. 2 (UNFCCC 2012e)  
Number of individual 
submissions: 2 
                                                 
1 Submissions by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kirgizstan, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Belarus, Tajikistan, United Arab Emirates 
were not analysed because of linguistic reasons.  
Approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. 
Submission by Lithuania and he EU (EU 2013a)  
Institutional arrangements under the UNFCCC for approaches to address loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change to enhance adaptive capacity (Norway 2013) 
 
Input from the G77 & China in preparation for COP19 on loss and damage associated with climate 
change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change (G77 and China 2013b) 
 
Views and information on elements of an international mechanism to address loss and damage from the 
adverse effects of climate change: Submission of Nauru on behalf of The Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS 2013b) 
 
Submissions by parties and 
organizations to the ADP 
Submission by the Republic of Nauru on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Plan of 
Work for the Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (AOSIS 2012) 
Statement by Nauru on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States at the Opening of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 4 June, Bonn, Germany (AOSIS 2014) 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin by 
IISD reporting Service 
Warsaw Highlights: Wednesday, 20 November 2013 (ENB 2013d) 
Warsaw Highlights: Friday, 15 November 2013.”(ENB 2013b) 
Warsaw Highlights: Saturday, 16 November 2013.”(ENB 2013c) 










Draft Paris Agreement (ADP 2015) 
Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Proposal by the President. Draft decision -/CP.21(UNFCCC 2015a) 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin by 
IISD reporting Service 
Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference: 1-14 December 2014 (ENB 2014) 
Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference: 29 November – 13 December 2015 (ENB 2015) 
 
Table 1: Primary and secondary sources used for carrying out the CDA 
Critical Discourse Analysis of the Warsaw decision (2/CP.19)  
Meso scale analysis 
The analysis of the discursive practice (meso scale in Fairclough’s model) is here taken 
as a starting point for understanding how the ‘authors’ of Decision 2/CP.19 (i.e. 
negotiators) drew on existing discourses when producing the text. It entails (a) eliciting 
the particular ways in which the authors understand and represent the issue, and (b) 
detecting how such views interacted. This section first systematises the Parties’ positions 
on L&D building on the submissions and statements delivered up to the Warsaw 
Conference. It then traces their emergence and interplay within the UNFCCC, focusing 
in particular on the negotiation dynamics during COP19. 
Discourses on L&D under the UNFCCC 
As already recalled, developing and developed countries frame L&D in two 
conflicting ways, the former claiming L&D to be something beyond adaptation and thus 
requiring additional and distinct instruments, and the latter including L&D within the 
scope of adaptation. These opposite views were embedded in several submissions and 
statements by Parties to the SBI between 2011 and 2012. For instance, Gambia referred 
to L&D as those ‘impacts that cannot be avoided by mitigation and can go beyond and 
exceed LDCs adaptive capacity’(UNFCCC 2011b). Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 
Ecuador, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, Philippines and Nicaragua followed 
suit by defining L&D as being ‘ “beyond adaptation”, (…) additional to adaptation, 
focusing on challenges of both identifying and addressing the instances when adaptation 
is no longer possible’. The position was also echoed by Ghana, Gambia on behalf of 
LDCs (UNFCCC 2012b) and by Swaziland on behalf of African states (UNFCCC 2012c). 
AOSIS, at the SBI Opening Plenary in Warsaw, reiterated the concept by qualifying L&D 
as ‘something else entirely’ from mitigation and adaptation (AOSIS 2013). This 
conceptualization of L&D as a third pillar of climate action has been based on the 
existence of tipping points in socio-ecological systems - see for instance Bolivia and 
Gambia in their submissions to SBI 37 (UNFCCC 2012b)-, as well as barriers in the 
capacity to adapt (UNFCCC 2011b) and respond (AOSIS 2013). As for the impacts 
considered, statements by developing countries focus on current or expected adverse 
effects of climate change that are in principle quantifiable and monetizable. These 
include, for instance, physical impacts –e.g. loss of land because of sea level rise – and 
economic impacts, as in the case of the loss of development opportunities advanced by 
Bolivia (UNFCCC 2012b). Consistently, the remedies sought are pragmatic in nature. 
They point to the establishment of insurance tools to contrast the financial risk posed by 
extremes as well as the creation of compensation/rehabilitation/solidarity funds. Financial 
support for disaster risk reduction activities has also been identified as a key factor for 
avoiding or reducing the potential for L&D to materialise. 
Calls for compensation, in particular, have been advanced by AOSIS since the 
early 1990s. During the very negotiations of the UNFCCC, the group proposed the 
establishment of an international insurance scheme to be funded by mandatory 
contributions from industrialised parties on the basis of their Gross National Product 
(GNP) and relative GHG emissions. The scheme was to compensate small island and 
low-lying developing nations for loss and damage resulting from sea level rise (SLR) 
(Linnerooth-bayer, Mace, and Verheyen 2003; AOSIS 2008). Traces of this proposal can 
still be found in article 4.8 of the 1991 Convention, where it calls on parties to consider 
appropriate actions ‘including (…) funding, insurance and the transfer of technology’ 
(Linnerooth-bayer, Mace, and Mechler 2013). The idea was advanced again in 2008 and 
2012, in the form of a MultiWindow Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from 
Climate Change Impacts in SIDS and other developing countries particularly vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change (AOSIS 2008). The mechanism comprised three inter-
dependent components: (1) an Insurance Component; (2) a Rehabilitation/Compensatory 
Component; (3) a Risk Management Component. The Compensatory component was 
deemed necessary to address the residual L&D resulting from slow onset events, ‘such 
as sea level rise, increasing land and sea surface temperatures, and ocean acidification’. 
Interestingly, the proposal cites State Responsibility among its guiding principles, 
together with the Polluter Pays Principle, common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), precautionary principle, principles of equity and 
intergenerational equity, and international solidarity. The reference to State 
Responsibility is of particular interest here as inextricably linked to the concept of 
compensation. The latter is indeed a type of reparation envisaged in the case of State 
Responsibility for wrongful acts. Although debated, some authors (Tol and Verheyen 
2004) believe it is possible to hold a state generally responsible for climate change 
damages for breaching the no harm rule under international customary law. This same 
argument has been often employed by developing Parties, although it caused some 
discomfort among industrialised ones (Warner and Zakieldeen 2011). Besides the AOSIS 
grouping, calls for compensation have been advanced by Sri Lanka (UNFCCC 2011a), 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ecuador, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, 
Philippines and Nicaragua (UNFCCC 2012a), Swaziland on behalf of African states 
(UNFCCC 2012b), and have culminated in a joint proposal by G77 and China for a L&D 
mechanism comprising ‘means of rehabilitation and/or compensation’ (G77 and China 
2013).  
On the other hand, developed countries have mostly avoided any references to 
compensation, and have tried instead to shift the attention to non-economic L&D, such 
as ‘losses of lives and negative impacts for health’, and ‘loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services necessary to sustain livelihoods’ (Norway 2013). The U.S. also raised 
ethical concerns, by claiming that an ‘international mechanism that includes insurance 
and compensation/ rehabilitation pillars would have to put a monetary value on the lives, 
livelihoods and assets of the most vulnerable countries and populations (UNFCCC 
2012b). Consistently, they sought to move the L&D discourse under the less contested 
and binding disaster risk reduction framework (Verheyen 2012). For instance, the EU 
stated that ‘comprehensively addressing loss and damage surpasses the remit of the 
UNFCCC’ and called for ‘strengthen[ing] synergies with the humanitarian and disaster 
risk community’. The appropriateness of the DRR policy arena was justified by the US in 
that it was impossible to attribute ‘the incidence of loss and damage to climate change, 
as opposed to natural climate variability and/or vulnerabilities stemming from non-
climatic stresses and trends like deforestation and development patterns’ (UNFCCC 
2012b). Such an attempt to shift the cause of L&D to domestic factors was highly 
criticised by the developing countries (UNFCCC 2012b; UNFCCC 2012a), which 
emphasised how ‘damage and loss can be exacerbated due to underlying vulnerabilities’ 
but that vulnerability and risk drivers could not be seen as the cause of climate change, 
as manifested through changes in extremes and slow onset events.  
As for the conceptualization of L&D, developed countries have hardly engaged 
in definitional issues within their official submissions. Norway glibly underlined how 
‘approaches to reduce the risk of loss and damage are (…) an integrated part of 
mitigation and adaptation efforts (UNFCCC 2012a). Along the same lines, the EU stated 
that ‘addressing loss and damage should be seen in the context of mitigation and 
adaptation and not as a separate issue’ (UNFCCC 2012b). The US, while opposing the 
creation of a dedicated mechanism, called on the Convention to enhance ‘adaptation 
action (…) in order to reduce the risk of loss and damage (UNFCCC 2012b). In general, 
they have opposed the establishment of a third pillar besides adaptation and mitigation, 
claiming that it would have just added complexity to the already intricate institutional 
structure of the UNFCCC (see for instance, Norway 2013). 
Interaction of discourses up to COP 19 
The establishment of the WIM is the result of a long process only culminating in 
Warsaw, through which the developing countries –and AOSIS in particular- were 
progressively able to influence the UNFCCC. The proactive role of AOSIS within climate 
change negotiations has been widely recognised and explained through its capacity for 
borrowing power (Betzold 2010) in a context of asymmetric negotiations (Zartman and 
Rubin 2002). In the specific case of L&D, AOSIS was able to gain the support of the 
developing countries as a whole, as confirmed by the submissions on L&D forwarded by 
the groupings of several developing countries and, most importantly by the G77/China. 
AOSIS could also count on the support of environmental NGOs both directly - in terms 
of technical and scientific expertise (Betzold 2010) and indirectly - in the form of a 
general endorsement of their positions (ActionAid/Care/WWF 2012; 
ActionAid/Care/WWF 2013; ActionAid 2010; ActionAid/Care/WWF/Germanwatch 
2012) and in the active campaigning made before and during COPs. Arguably, most of 
the results were obtained by resorting to ‘context based strategies’, i.e. referring to 
principles and norms. In particular, the recourse to widely accepted principles of 
international law, such as those referred to in the MultiWindow Proposal (AOSIS 2008), 
contributed to reinforce AOSIS’ negotiating power (Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu 
2012). Moreover, the well-established argument of insular states being the least 
responsible for climate change but the most adversely impacted by it, added to the moral 
legitimacy of AOSIS’ claims beside the legal one. Taken together, these strategies led the 
issue of L&D –as framed by the developing world- to gain increasing visibility within 
climate change talks and to get the support of practitioners and academics. On the other 
hand, developed countries mostly opted for defensive strategies, trying to neutralise the 
L&D discourse through recourse to disaster risk reduction and standard narratives of 
climate change adaptation. 
Despite such increased negotiating power, the developing countries had a hard 
time in pursuing their interests at COP 19. This is shown by the analysis of the High Level 
Segment statements by Heads of States and Governments as well as the IISD reporting 
services coverage of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference. L&D was one of the major 
outcomes to be expected from the Warsaw meeting. Yet, Parties endorsed this agenda 
item with a differentiated sense of urgency. Among the 113 High Level Segment 
Statements analysed, the establishment of the mechanism was referred to in 52 of them, 
among which only 4 were put forward by developed countries. Among them, the EU 
(2013) and Ireland (2013) called for progress on, inter alia, the L&D mechanism. On the 
contrary, the statements by Russia (Russian Federation 2013) and by the Umbrella Group 
(2013), while recognizing the importance of adaptation for the most vulnerable countries, 
stressed that ‘drawing on existing arrangements provides the best means to address loss 
and damage’.  
These diverging views were only the prelude to a complex negotiating process. 
Difficulties in agreeing on the mechanism within the SBI resulted in several 
manifestations of impatience among negotiators, with the Philippines expressing ‘deep 
concern’ over the lack of progress on L&D together with Fiji for G77/China, Nauru for 
AOSIS, and Nepal for LCDs (ENB 2013b). Without significant progress on the issue, the 
SBI adopted its conclusions (UNFCCC 2013a) forwarding them to the COP for further 
consideration (ENB 2013c). The blockage continued within the high level segment of the 
COP, where some developing countries expressed disappointment over the developed 
countries’ lack of commitment (ENB 2013d). The COP President requested ministerial 
support to continue consultations: the outcome was then presented to the COP for 
adoption (UNFCCC 2013a). The text (Decision 2/CP.19) was finally adopted, as orally 
amended in the plenary, after a long debate about the provision placing the mechanism 
under the Cancun Adaptation Framework (ENB 2013a). 
Micro Scale analysis 
A comparison between the text of the Draft COP decision proposed by the 
President (UNFCCC 2013b) and the text that was finally adopted -Decision 2/CP.19 
(UNFCCC 2014a)- illustrates the points on which compromise was reached. Coupled 
with the linguistic analysis (micro scale in Fairclough’s model), it also reveals the knots 
in the conceptualisation of L&D that Parties were not able to untie. Three main 
formulations were added to the draft proposal by the President in order to reach a final 
resolution: 
(1) ‘Also acknowledging that loss and damage associated with the adverse 
effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves more than, 
that which can be reduced by adaptation,’ (preamble);  
(2) ‘subject to review at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the 
Parties (November–December 2016) pursuant to paragraph 15 below,’ 
(§1 of the Decision); 
(3)  ‘including its structure, mandate and effectiveness,’ (§15 of the Decision) 
The first formulation was introduced to accommodate the opposite understandings 
by the developed and developing countries on L&D. A systematic reading of 2/CP.19 
reveals that the text defines the relationship between L&D and adaptation in two opposing 
ways. According to line 6 of the Decision, L&D ‘includes, and in some cases involves 
more than, that which can be reduced by adaptation’, while at line 13 the WIM is placed 
‘under the Cancun Adaptation Framework’. The first statement recognizes L&D as 
something which, in some cases, can go beyond adaptation and thus recognizes the claims 
of the developing countries. On the contrary, the second statement –placing L&D under 
the Cancun Adaptation Framework- suggests a relationship of subordination between the 
concepts, with L&D being a part of adaptation as argued by the developed countries. This 
is a case of ‘constructive ambiguity’, a tool often used in diplomacy to surmont situations 
of impasse (Berridge and James 2001). It is employed when parties have strong and 
contradictory interests and views and/or the negotiations are running short of time (Pehar 
2011).  
The incapacity to agree on a shared definition on L&D is also shown by the 
insertion of the second and the third formulations, requiring a review of the mechanism 
‘including its structure, mandate and effectiveness’ at COP 22 in 2016. Arguably, the 
requirement was included following the request by the developing parties’ to leave the 
door open for L&D to be separated from adaptation during the 2016 revision.  
Another interesting consideration can be made on the basis of the linguistic 
analysis and deals with the issue of climate change attribution. In Decision 2/CP.19 and 
in those adopted since Bali, L&D is referred to as being associated with climate change 
impacts, including extreme weather events and slow onset events. This might represent 
another case of constructive ambiguity in its lexical form. The verb ‘associate’ implies a 
connection between two things either because they occur together or because one 
produces the other (Stevenson 2011). Thus, the verb can entail different relationships 
linking the concepts: they can be on the same level, being simply connected, or one can 
be subordinated to the other, as caused by the latter. Additional research should be done 
to understand why this specific expression has been used in the negotiations process. It 
could possibly signal a compromise among Parties on the legitimacy of L&D to be 
discussed within the climate change arena. Indeed, the term is broad enough to include 
the possibility for L&D to be treated under the UNFCCC, without explicitly and formally 
recognizing any strict causal link with climate change impacts. This would be consistent, 
for instance, with the claims by some developed countries that it is impossible to 
disentangle domestic issues of vulnerability and exposure when accounting for L&D. 
Alternatively, the expression could simply refer to the current uncertainty in attributing 
extreme events to anthropogenic climate change (IPCC 2012; IPCC 2013), where it is 
still problematic for very rare weather events to gain enough statistical power to detect a 
trend (Huggel et al. 2013).  
The issue of attribution is of the outermost importance when talking about 
compensation as the causal link between the damage and the act/omission is a necessary 
condition for ascribing responsibility to a State. However, it might not always be possible 
to prove the causal link between GHG emissions and meteorological change and to 
establish a link between the latter and related adverse impacts. Distinguishing the 
contribution and the signs of other factors, especially exposure and vulnerability, to L&D 
is equally complex. In the absence of such causal links, it becomes difficult in the end to 
make claims for compensations. Yet it is interesting to note how these uncertainties are 
often linguistically put aside by the developing countries. Arguably, the attempt is to 
avoid confronting the possibility that the lack of robust scientific evidence might imply 
(and more importantly, might be used) to delay action. An example is provided by 
Nauru’s submission to COP 19 where the alleged causal link between L&D and climate 
change impacts is made explicit by the very title: ‘Views and information on elements of 
an international mechanism to address loss and damage from the adverse effects of 
climate change’ (AOSIS 2013), where the preposition ‘from’ semantically indicates the 
source or cause of something (Stevenson 2011). 
Macro scale analysis 
Moving now to the macro scale in Fairclough’s model, we can draw attention to 
the question of whether the existing order of discourse on L&D has been transformed by 
discursive practices at COP 19 negotiations. Undoubtedly, the developing countries were 
able to introduce and institutionalise a ‘new’ discourse on L&D in the final text of 
Decision 2/CP.19 in referring to it as something beyond adaptation. This was important 
not only from a conceptual point of view, but also to give dignity and strength to the 
claimed need for the elaboration of different and additional means to address L&D beside 
adaptation. Nevertheless, the way in which the developing countries conceptualised L&D 
was not fully endorsed by other Parties – at least, not up to the Paris climate change 
conference. What reasonably happened in Warsaw was that developed countries ‘learned’ 
this new discourse for the purpose of closing the negotiation process, but at the same time 
they refrained from internalizing it. Indeed, new discourses may come into an institution 
without being enacted or inculcated (i.e. owned by subjects), or they may be enacted but 
never fully inculcated (Fairclough 2003). 
This impression is reinforced by the way L&D was dealt with during the 
subsequent negotiation rounds. One could recall, for instance, the hard time AOSIS had 
in inserting a mere reference to L&D and the WIM in the preamble of the Lima Call for 
Climate action at COP 20 (ENB 2014). Lively exchanges of views also characterised 
discussions under the ADP with regard to the inclusion of L&D in the Paris Agreement. 
While the developing countries were advocating the insertion of a dedicated article on 
L&D, calling for it to be ‘a central element of the Paris agreement’, and treated as 
‘separate and distinct’ from adaptation, the developed countries campaigned against 
including any reference in the final text. The proposal by the US, Canada, Switzerland, 
Norway, Japan, and New Zealand with the general support of the EU, while suggesting 
the permanence of the WIM after 2020, offered to address L&D by means of COP 
decisions (ADP 2015), a tool whose legal binding nature is highly debated (Beyerlin and 
Marauhn 2011). As a response, the G/77 and China raised the stakes by advancing the 
establishment of a new mechanism under the agreement which was to replace the WIM 
and feature a climate displacement coordination facility ‘to address the displacement of 
people as a result of extreme impacts of climate change’ (ADP 2015). During COP 21 
itself, negotiations on L&D proved to be contentious from the very start and it took an 
entire week to get the first formal advancement on the issue. It was only with the release 
of the first Draft of the Agreement on November 5th that two options for L&D to appear 
in the final text were included: as a separate article or as a part of the adaptation provisions 
(UNFCCC 2015b). 
It is true that the developing countries eventually managed to get a stand-alone 
article on L&D, formally crystallising the idea of its being something distinct from 
adaptation. In this sense they scored a historic victory. Yet the discussions recalled above 
show the fragility of the consensus reached from Warsaw onwards and eventually cast 
doubts on the very results obtained in Paris. L&D looks like a foreign body within the 
Agreement architecture, as no reference is made to Article 8 by other treaty provisions. It 
is not mentioned in the purpose of the Agreement (Article 2), in the context of the 
‘ambitious efforts’ required to achieve it (Article 3), in the related transparency 
framework (Article 13), or in the global stocktake process (Article 14). This signals not 
only the ‘last minute’ nature of the agreement reached at COP 21, but also -and most 
importantly- the contested status that L&D continues to have under the UNFCCC. 
Besides the symbolic meaning of keeping L&D separate from adaptation, Article 8 
contains tentative, cautious language, calling again for an explorative rather than an 
operative mandate. Overall, the attempt by the developing countries to transform the order 
of discourse by elevating L&D to a third pillar of climate action, subsequent to the 
‘preventive’ phase of mitigation and the ‘managing’ phase of adaptation (CDKN 2012), 
seems to have been only partially achieved. 
Discussion 
The CDA carried out in the previous section made it possible to reconstruct the 
emergence and the evolution of discourses on L&D under the UNFCCC, by showing how 
their interaction eventually resulted in the establishment of the WIM. It illustrated the 
conflicting views of Parties on the positioning of L&D vis-à-vis the adaptation space 
(L&D as part of or as beyond adaptation) as well as the narratives employed to support 
these standpoints. As a whole, the developed countries’ discursive practice aimed at 
neutralising the conceptualization of L&D as a new pillar of climate action by shifting its 
focus towards the alternative (and less contested) humanitarian and disaster risk policy 
frameworks. Science was also used to delegitimise compensation claims, by stressing the 
impossibility of distinguishing the contribution of climate change to L&D from other 
factors, such as natural climate variability or existing patterns of vulnerability and 
exposure. Finally, ethical claims were also made to avoid the ‘monetisation’ of the 
discourse, by hinting at the inappropriateness of placing price-tags on the lives, 
livelihoods and assets of the most vulnerable countries and populations. 
The ethical imperative raised by the developing countries was substantially 
different. It pointed instead to the unfairness of climate change (affecting first those least 
responsible for the problem) and to the threats for survival it posed for the most exposed 
communities. The legal counterpart of the ethical imperative, i.e. the State Responsibility-
compensation argument, equally became a leitmotiv in the conceptualization of L&D by 
the developing countries. However, as the analysis of statements and submissions shows, 
its employment might have lost momentum in climate talks. It surely represented a 
cornerstone in the requests by the developing countries up to the Warsaw conference in 
2013. It was indeed the main request embedded in the 1991 insurance scheme proposal 
for addressing the impacts deriving from SLR. The 2008 MultiWindow Proposal widened 
the range of the hazards considered by including extremes, and consistently called for an 
insurance component to manage the associated financial risks. Yet the compensatory 
component continued to stand out and be campaigned as the sole way to address the 
unavoidable impacts resulting from slow onset events. This standpoint was maintained 
not only by AOSIS, but also by the groupings of other developing countries (e.g. the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - ALBA) and even most importantly, 
by the G 77 as a whole. After Warsaw, however, calls for compensation have become 
episodic. Briefly after the conclusion of COP 19, the developing countries’ negotiators 
on L&D downplayed the importance of financial compensation, stating that it ‘may 
represent a normative solution to the perils of vulnerable countries, but does not 
necessarily mean that the underlying needs are addressed’ (Hoffmaister et al. 2014). An 
analysis of recent submissions by Parties indicates little recourse to the concept. As an 
interesting exception, an early 2015 draft of the Paris agreement mentioned 
‘compensation measures for people displaced by climate change’ among the functions to 
be performed by the proposed Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility 
(Wentz and Burger 2015). The provision was nevertheless dropped – without excessive 
clamour- in subsequent talks.  
The parabola of the ‘compensation argument’ suggests a progressive 
transformation of this concept from being an ‘end’ to being a ‘mean’. It could be argued 
that rather than being an objective per se, compensation has been used by AOSIS as a 
bogeyman to increasingly get concessions on L&D from the developed countries. Such a 
strategic use of the concept may not have characterised the positions small islands from 
the beginning but may have appeared at a later stage, when it became clear that the lack 
of legitimation of the L&D issue under the UNFCCC would eventually prevent any 
meaningful advancement on the issue. Hence, calls for compensations may have been 
used strategically to obtain the institutionalisation of the L&D discourse under the 
UNFCCC, first through the WIM and then through its crystallisation by article 8 of the 
Paris Agreement. In this perspective, the establishment of the mechanism may have had 
more a symbolic rather than a practical significance. The impression is reinforced by the 
outcome of COP 21, where Parties eventually confirmed an explorative rather than an 
operational mandate for the WIM. 
The limited recourse to the State Responsibility-compensation argument can also 
be explained by a progressive loss of appeal due to the difficulties in its activation. In 
fact, the applicability of a legal remedy to L&D is arguable, especially when considering 
issues of attribution of extremes to anthropogenic climate change. Another emerging 
concept such as state liability, i.e. responsibility for acts not prohibited by international 
law, has been proposed as a better framework for the issue (Hyvarinen 2012)2. There are 
however two drawbacks in the employment of the state liability argument. The first 
concerns its viability as a legal option: the concept is still rudimentary within International 
Law and the possibility to employ it as a general principle of customary law is disputable. 
So far it has been envisaged only by the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (1972). The second issue touches upon the political 
opportuneness of using such an argument. Although not referring to fault -no international 
obligation has to be breached-, liability would inevitably imply compensation and again 
cause discomfort among Parties. 
With calls for compensatory justice being put aside, it would be tempting to think 
that the underlying requests and needs of the developing countries have been eventually 
satisfied, though this is probably not the case. L&D continues to be a particularly thorny 
matter because it is inherently connected to other controversial and unresolved discourses 
under the UNFCCC: those of historical responsibility and differentiation. Talking about 
historical responsibility means recognising that past GHG emissions should be taken in 
consideration when deciding who has caused the present situation and who should 
therefore take on a larger responsibility in addressing the problem (Friman 2007). 
Moreover, when coupled with the concept of differentiation, historical responsibility has 
become the rationale for and the way to concretely operationalising equity (Friman and 
Hjerpe 2015). Yet a consensus on how these concepts should be interpreted and -most 
importantly- made operational seems far from being reached, and this ultimately prevents 
the L&D issue from making significant progress.   
                                                 
2 Indeed, this kind of more sophisticated and solidaristic responsibility (Conforti 2002), allows 
for sidestepping the stringency of the act-damage causal link required for state responsibility. 
With the primary aim being that of safeguarding victims, causality is more flexibly 
determined taking into account the complexity of the ecological system, including 
uncertainty, presence of multiple overlapping causes, and the temporal separation between 
act and damage (Barboza 2011). 
In this perspective, the compromise reached on article 8 of the Paris Agreement 
might be more fragile than it seems. Paragraph 52 of the accompanying decision states 
that the article should not ‘involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation’ 
claims (UNFCCC 2015a). This formulation was the result of the diplomatic work carried 
out behind the scenes by the US and the small island representatives, in which the latter 
probably gave up the possibility of a legal remedy in order to have the 1.5°C temperature 
goal placed in the text. President Obama’s pledge of a contribution of USD 30 million to 
climate risk insurance schemes in the Pacific, Central America and Africa (Rowling 
2015) might also have contributed to paving the way for a compromise. The solution, 
however, was not supported by developing countries as whole and indeed marked a 
division among them with respect to the way L&D should be advanced in climate talks. 
The Philippines expressed deep concern and Bolivia stated that ‘no clause can deny 
people and countries’ rights to ask for compensation’ and that ‘all the necessary 
institutional means will be used so that [climate] justice can be made’ (Bolivia 2015). The 
issue of compensation might not be the ‘elephant in the room’ anymore. However, the 
statements by Bolivia and the Philippines suggest that –far from being settled- the dispute 
is likely to emerge again and play a role in the development of climate negotiations in the 
years to come.   
 
Conclusions 
Despite being one of the hottest topics to have emerged within climate negotiations in 
recent years, the issue of L&D still lacks a clear conceptualization. At the negotiation 
level, it has been the centre of a polarized and heated debate between the developing and 
developed world which has contributed little to developing a shared meaning. This paper 
has employed a critical discourse analytical approach to reconstruct and explain the 
different positions endorsed by Parties on L&D, and to analyse how their interaction 
eventually resulted in the establishment of the WIM. It has traced the negotiating 
strategies of Parties up to the Warsaw and Paris Conferences, by identifying the legal, 
scientific and ethical arguments employed to support them. It has highlighted the ample 
reliance by the developing countries on legal reasoning and their framing of L&D as a 
case of State Responsibility for wrongful acts. This paper has shown how the corollary 
concept of compensation, which has dominated the discussion since the early 1990’s, may 
have been employed in a strategic way to obtain a formal legitimation of the L&D 
discourse within the UNFCCC rather than a remedy per se. On the other hand, it has 
unveiled the defensive strategies put in place by the developed countries and the use of 
scientific knowledge and ethical considerations to neutralize the developing parties’ 
requests.  
The CDA carried out in this paper has not only aimed at ‘making sense of the 
past’ and explaining negotiating dynamics up to the present. Rather, its ambition has been 
to identify current stumbling blocks that need to be overcome to advance action on L&D. 
The current disagreement on the positioning of L&D vis-à-vis the adaptation space is 
surely one of them. The institutional advancements obtained on L&D, as exemplified by 
the creation of the WIM and Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, in fact do not correspond 
to any comparable progress in its understanding. Without (political) agreement on its 
conceptual boundaries, meaningful action on L&D will be eventually difficult to promote 
and the WIM will be confined to its explorative rather than operational mandate. Science 
and research can effectively support this process by providing relevant knowledge and 
contributing to neutralise the ideologisation of discourses. However, as the debate on 
climate change attribution shows, this role must be carefully undertaken. The 
politicisation of science, especially in policy domains where positions are polarised, is a 
concrete risk.  
A second (and major) stumbling block lies in the connection of L&D to other 
contested discourses under the UNFCCC, namely historical responsibility and 
differentiations. The issue of L&D has at its core a more general request for climate equity 
and justice that the UNFCCC has not yet addressed. This paper has therefore pointed out 
the importance of looking at the L&D issue in a systemic way, connecting it to other 
discursive dynamics under the UNFCCC as well as to other relevant policy arenas where 
key Gordian knots that prevent action on L&D could be cut.  
Finally, this paper has highlighted the need for a deeper investigation of power 
dynamics within the UNFCCC. By employing a CDA, it has adopted a retro perspective 
approach and provided insights on the unfolding of power relations on L&D up to the 
Paris agreement, analysing their current crystallisation within the WIM and identifying 
political barriers that need to be overcome. This can provide a useful basis on which future 
IR research can build upon. L&D indeed represent an interesting case of the so-called 
structuralist paradox in negotiation (Zartman and Rubin 2002), that is the capacity of 
weaker negotiating parties (the developing countries, in this case) to negotiate with 
stronger ones and get significant results (e.g., the WIM). Future research is needed to 
identify the sources of negotiating power of the developing countries and to understand 
how these can evolve and impact future negotiation rounds. The ultimate objective should 
be to identify entry points for fostering international cooperation on L&D, and thus 
contribute to the advancement of this complex, multifaceted issue.  
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